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The Business of Security and the Transformation of the State 
ABSTRACT 
The field of security policy seems to have undergone dramatic changes in the last dec-
ades. Under the broad umbrella of a turn to security governance, one can observe trends 
of an internationalization and privatization of security. Of these trends, one seems to 
stand out, that is the increasing reliance of states on private business actors in the provi-
sion of security. How do theses trends affect the state? While some believe that the pro-
vision of security by private agents is unproblematic as long as the state keeps its gov-
ernmental supervision, others fear that the state is losing its capability to control the 
activities of private actors in the field of security, the more privatization proceeds. The 
working paper, firstly, provides a systematic overview on the inclusion of private busi-
ness actors in the provision of security. Secondly, it will address the question of its con-
sequences for the state. The papers highlights that privatization stops short of transform-
ing the state but it is about to weaken the democratic legitimation of the use of force. 
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The Business of Security and the Transformation of the State 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
The field of international security and security politics has undergone some remarkable 
changes during the last decades. Traditionally, the production and supply of security has 
been understood as one of the core functions of the modern nation-state. Under the 
broad umbrella of a turn to security governance, however, security provision has taken 
quite different shapes which can be roughly highlighted as internationalization and pri-
vatization. Increasingly, the organization of security politics has been internationalized 
at least within the OECD-world (Jachtenfuchs 2005; Krahmann 2003). International 
institutions take over responsibility for an ever-larger share of security policies and in-
crease the pressure on harmonization of national security organization and structure. 
Examples range from the development of a European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP; Wagner 2005), which probes an integrated European military and command 
structure, to NATO-doctrines which rely on a harmonization in weapons procurement, 
military strategies and tactics to multilateral interventions and counter-terrorism-
strategies of the United Nations (Biersteker 2004), all aiming to further integrate na-
tional security policies and politics. 
Likewise, a number of private actors have entered the stage which challenges the 
state's role in providing security. In failing and failed states, mostly in the non-OECD-
world, in which the public order is about to collapse, private actors are often forced to 
produce and supply security by themselves (Lilly 2000; Chojnacki 2007; Mandel 2002). 
Alternatively, however, even “strong” states in the OECD-world increasingly outsource 
or share security provision with private actors, be it private security providers guarding 
military camps or operating modern weapons systems or public-private partnerships 
between governments, International Organizations and private business actors to regu-
late certain practices, as for instance the Kimberley Process to counter the trade of con-
flict diamonds (Bone 2004; Wolf et al. 2007; Huckel et al. 2007). Similarly, Interna-
tional Organizations such as the United Nations or even NATO have increasingly come 
to rely on or co-operate with private actors in organizing and securing humanitarian 
assistance in conflict zones (Bryden/Hänggi 2005). 
                                                 
1  This paper has profited enormously from discussions within the research team on Business and Conflict at Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), especially Melanie Zimmer, Moira Feil, Susanne Fischer, Andreas Haidvogl 
and Klaus Dieter Wolf. I am also grateful to Alexander Kocks and two anonymous reviewers for their comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. 
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Although such developments in the field of security lag behind quite similar trends in 
other policy areas, they mirror these well-documented changes in policy areas such as 
labor standards, water management or transportation in which the state seems to lose its 
role as a central provider of public goods and is perceived to share it or even compete 
with a range of private actors in the provision of these goods. Of the above mentioned 
trends, this paper focuses on the increasing reliance on private business actors in the 
provision of external security and ask if and if so how they affect the role of state in the 
provision of security.  
Private business actors enter the field of security in two broad ways. One is rather in-
direct. In this way, transnational corporations (TNCs) are either called upon by states, 
civil society or the international community to engage in security measures in their day-
to-day operations (for instance the Global Compact, or the Wolfsberg principles), they 
partner with strong states in Public-Private-Partnerships to provide security in areas of 
limited statehood or they commit themselves to private self-regulation schemes such as 
codes of conduct (Wolf et al. 2007; Feil et al. 2008; Bailes/Frommelt 2004). This is the 
area of Corporate Social or Security Responsibility. The involvement of private busi-
ness corporations in the provision of security often comes about as a result of increasing 
pressure of states, the international community and civil society alike as well as a need 
to secure their investment and day-to-day-operations in zones of weak government and 
conflict. Basically, TNCs are drawn into security governance measures but it is by no 
means their primary focus (Wolf et al. 2007; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009). 
But apart from such “regular” TNCs there is another type of business actor in the 
field of security policy, that specializes in security, the so called Private Security and 
Military Companies (PSMCs). Their involvement signals the increasing outsourcing or 
contracting of the state with PSMCs to provide specific security services, such as com-
bat support (comprising the whole range of logistics, intelligence, weapons mainte-
nance), convoy, personal and facility security, advice and training (risk-management, 
military and security training measures and weapons procurement) or even combat 
(field troops or weapons operation in theater). This is the most direct way in which pri-
vate business actors might enter the field of security politics although often not the most 
visible. In contrast to TNCs for PSMCs security provision is not an additional burden 
but their core mission. These actors sell security as a commodity to those customers 
willing and capable to pay for their services. 
Overall, outsourcing and contracting with private business has increased in impor-
tance in nearly all OECD-states, albeit in varying degrees. Among the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, privatization is strongest, and unmatched within the United States. Still, it is 
on the rise in other states as well. This development is strengthened by a general dena-
tionalization of security threats (Zangl/Zürn 2003) and an ideological trend which per-
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ceives of outsourcing or partnering with private actors in the provision of public goods 
as a high hope for the future of (global) governance (Ottaway 2001a: 267; Reinicke 
1999-2000; Börzel/Risse 2005). It is supposed to relax state resources, as being more 
cost-efficient, as well as to increase flexibility (Huckel et al. 2007; Haufler 2004).  
Given these trends, this paper asks as to how privatization in general and private 
business actors in particular affect the role of the state in providing security? There 
seem to be two principal positions on that. One holds that the inclusion of private actors 
is unproblematic for the state as long as the latter is able to control the conditions under 
which they operate, thus making the business of security just another facet of the state’s 
multiple strategies to fulfill its functions (Grimm 2002: 1305; also Shearer 1998). The 
other position, however, suggests that privatization might have inherent features which 
undermine the state’s control in the long run (Leander 2005; Avant 2005: 253ff). 
The paper provides an overview of the inclusion of private business actors in the 
field of security policy to assess their potential to lead to a transformation of the state. It 
outlines the connection between the modern state and the monopoly of force and formu-
lates broad indicators as to what kind of changes in international security politics would 
amount to a beginning transformational effect on the state (part 2). After a discussion of 
the recent changes of security threats and politics (part 3), it then turns to an analysis of 
two principal types of private business actors in security politics: the activities of TNCs 
in zones of conflict and the outsourcing to PSMCs in military interventions (part 4). 
Finally, it compares these actors with regard to their effects on the state (part 5). The 
analysis highlights that TNCs do not affect the state’s monopoly of violence in any 
meaningful way, different to what one could expect given the political expectations to-
wards these actors. In contrast, PSMCs have discernable effects on the state’s monopoly 
of violence although an accurate assessment of long-term effects is difficult at this 
stage. Still, it can be shown that privatization stops short of transforming the state yet 
but it is about to weaken the democratic legitimation of the use of force. 
2. SECURITY AND THE STATE 
Historically, the monopoly of the use of force in the hands of the state is among the first 
characteristics in the formation of the modern nation-state (Giddens 1987; Thomson 
1994; Grimm 2002) in Western Europe, associated with the consolidation of the territo-
rial state (Leibfried/Zürn 2005: 5f). Nevertheless it has taken for centuries for the state 
to eliminate private competitors in the use of force to establish this monopoly, which 
was never empirically uncontested.2 Once established, however, security by the state 
                                                 
2  Private actors were never completely abandoned in security (Grimm 2002; 1301), be it in the form of privateering 
or chartered companies during 16th, 17th, asnd 18th centuries (Wolf 2009; Ortiz 2007), the mercenary activities 
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comprised internal security (criminal law and policing) and external security (interna-
tional law and the military). 
During the centuries, the monopoly on the use of force has undergone several devel-
opments which sum up to a firstly, legal (the constitutional state) and later democratic 
civilization (the democratic state) of the use of force (Leibfried/Zürn 2005). The mo-
nopoly has changed to be understood as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
which not only connotes the idea that only states can legitimately resort to force but also 
that they are legitimated to do so given a legal framework and democratic processes 
defining the conditions of the use of force (Grimm 2002: 198-1302). Security, on many 
accounts, most famous the one of Weber (1972), lies at the heart of the modern state 
(Grimm 2002: 1299), not only because it came first in its formation but also because of 
its potential effects on society and the individual. Security makes the Janus face of the 
state most explicit, being the protector of society but its greatest threat as well as it has 
the power to unleash unlimited violence upon it (Zürn/Leibfried 2005: 4). The famous 
picture of the fabulous beast, the “leviathan”, highlights this best. Legal embeddedness 
and democratic process restrain this power but they do not destroy it. The nasty brutish 
face of the Leviathan still lurks out behind the civilized, even bureaucratic processes of 
modern nation-states, leading Derrida to imply the sovereign state himself to be a rogue: 
“The reliance on terror and horror has always been […] the last resort of the sovereign 
state: implicit or explicit, rude or subtle, contractual or hidden in paternalistic terms. To 
claim the contrary is always a denial, a rationalization, sometimes a ‘Vernünftelei’ that 
should not deceive us” (Derrida 2006: 212, my translation). 
It is thus not surprising that we are particularly irritated of privatization trends within 
the field of security as they give rise to worries of an unleashing of this inherently un-
conditional power to destroy. On the other hand, however, changes in the provision of 
security might simply be innovative tools to exercise the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force in response to altered political or economic environments not challenges to 
the monopoly itself or the state. Indeed, one could even argue that these trends rather 
signal a move of ‘back to normal’, inspired by the pre-modern patterns of public-private 
co-production of statehood, with the modern western nation state being merely an 
ephemeral artefact (Wolf 2009). 
The golden-age of the nation-state of the 1960s and 1970s was defined by the actual 
convergence and reinforcing character of its four dimensions at the national level, i.e. 
the resource, the legal, the legitimacy, and the welfare dimension, or: TRUDI (Leib-
fried/Zürn 2005: 10f). Thus, the question arises as up to what point we can talk of a 
                                                                                                                                               
that varied during the centuries ( Thomson 1994) or private support personnel accompanying the state’s armed 
forces at all times (Schaller 2007). 
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change of “the” state or a transformation of the state instead of variations in the organi-
zation or institutionalization of activities in one of its dimensions with regard to secu-
rity. For instance, even though democratic control of the exercise of the use of force is a 
feature shared by all OECD-states, there are huge variations in its organization and in-
stitutionalization (Peters/Wagner 2008; Born/Hänggi 2005). Similarly, most states have 
differing principles regarding the organization of police and the military or their separa-
tion (Jachtenfuchs 2005). 
Following the TranState approach, the paper will trace the recent privatization trends 
in the provision of security as to whether it is (1) epidemic in that it can be observed in 
the majority of OECD-states, and, (2) whether it is beyond corridor variation, i.e. 
whether the observed shift is either fundamental to the dimension or/and affects more 
than one dimension of the state, giving rise to new configurations of statehood (Leib-
fried/Zürn 2005).With regard to the second question, the analysis will focus on three 
broad indicators. For the resource dimension, i.e. the possession of the means of vio-
lence, it will assess in how far privatization affects (a) the state’s autonomy of decision-
making on the use of force; and (b) the state’s control on the exercise of force. Turning 
to the inherent connection of the dimensions, the analysis will focus on (c) the effects of 
privatization for the democratic legitimation processes on the use of force.  
The underlying hypotheses are that the more states rely on private business actors, 
the more they become dependent on their resources. Moreover, an increased level of 
privatization might also affect the configuration of statehood. Privatization has the po-
tential to undermine TRUDI’s achievement of a reinforcing effect of its dimensions by 
weakening the link between the factual monopoly on force (the resource dimension) and 
its democratic legitimation (the legitimacy dimension). Both effects obviously lie in the 
future so it is impossible to test these hypotheses in any strict way. Instead, the analysis 
attempts to collect first evidence that support or reject them. 
3. CHANGES IN SECURITY AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
At least since World War II, the dominant problem of international security seemed to 
be that of inter-state war.3 Consequently, international security policies focused on the 
prevention or resolution of inter-state conflicts. International cooperation in security 
matters was minimal and at best involved inter-state regimes such as the development of 
security alliances to counter collective threats (like NATO or the Washaw Pact) or regu-
lations to control or reduce armaments (Müller 2002; Zangl/Zürn 2003; Wulf 2005), all 
aimed at reducing the risk of inter-state war or its consequences. 
                                                 
3  Even though the ratio between inter-state war and intra-state war was already tipping towards the latter in that 
period. Still, policy-makers focused their attention on classic inter-state war. 
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However, with the end of the Cold War, the effects of globalization and denationali-
zation already present in many other policy fields began to materialize in security as 
well. In this context, even the understanding of security began to change, comprising 
increasingly non-military threats such as transnational crime, terrorism, gross human 
rights violations, epidemics, migration or environmental threats (Hampson et al. 2002). 
Security no longer focused solely on the survival of the state but also on individuals, as 
is expressed in the notion of human security or the establishment of a ‘responsibility to 
protect’ (Brock 2004; ICIIS 2002). Among other factors, the broadening of the under-
standing of security threats was a reflection of changes in the nature of conflicts and 
warfare states and the international community are facing today. The once predominant 
inter-state conflicts are decreasing since World War II while intra-, sub- and non-state 
conflicts have generally gained in importance and make up for about 90 percent of all 
wars today (Chojnacki 2005, 2006). Many of these conflicts share some basic character-
istics, which have led many to dub them “New Wars” (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002). 
Among these characteristics are the blurring of combatants and non-combatants as con-
flict parties are often non-state actors which do not have an organized or uniformed 
military, as conflict parties do change quite frequently during conflicts because they 
split up in rival groups and re-align in different patterns. Furthermore, these conflicts, 
often fought with light weapons and guerilla tactics, show a prevalence of violence 
against the civilian population and in many of them political and economic motifs of 
fighting by conflict parties are hard to distinguish. War economies have emerged in 
which fighting seem to be determined by the chance to gain economic wealth not politi-
cal control of a territory. Often, these conflicts take place in or fuel weak or failing state 
structures leaving even the supply of basic security functions by the state questionable 
and, finally, they share a tendency to spread to neighboring regions resulting in trans-
national or regional conflict systems like in West Africa or the Balkans region.4  
In total, one could speak of a trend of a privatization or denationalization of security 
threats that states and the international community are confronted with today. In conse-
quence, international security policies have changed as well. Military interventions in 
these kinds of conflicts have not only increased dramatically during the 1990s but have 
also changed their character. Most often, we observe multilateral interventions by the 
UN, NATO or other regional alliances or even changing coalitions of the willing, 
mostly of western states (Geis 2006). Furthermore, interventions, especially in failing 
and failed states, have become more complex and require long term post-conflict recon-
struction and stabilization as evidenced in the increase of protectorates as in Kosovo or 
East Timor. But apart from the increased importance of military means in global gov-
                                                 
4 Vgl. Le Billon (2001, 2003); Reno (2000); Duffield (2001). 
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ernance we can also witness a growing privatization of security politics. Roughly speak-
ing, privatization of security comes in two types: bottom up and top-down. Bottom-up 
privatization captures essentially the features of the “new wars” as described above. It 
refers to private actors who take up security matters on their own either because the 
state is not capable or unwilling to provide public security to its citizens. Bottom-up 
privatization is particularly visible in weak states but poses great risks for strong states 
as well as for instance in the form of transnational terrorism. Top-down privatization, on 
the other hand, could be partly understood as a reaction to bottom-up privatization. It 
refers to the delegation, partnering and contracting of states and IOs to and with private 
actors to contribute to or take over the provision of security in certain areas and time 
frames, a strategy visible in weak and strong states. 
4. TRANSFORMING THE STATE? PRIVATE BUSINESS ACTORS IN 
SECURITY 
4.1. Corporate Security Responsibility: Transnational Corporations and 
Zones of Conflict  
The aforementioned developments pose several challenges for transnational working 
business corporations (TNCs). On the one hand, many corporations had accessed new 
markets and invested into transition or developing counties after the cold war to reap the 
benefits of cheap labor or because of the location of valuable natural resources such as 
oil, timber, gold or diamonds (Avant 2005: 180f). Faced with the spread of conflicts 
zones and respectively failing or weak state structures these companies faced difficult 
decisions as to whether to withdraw from these areas or to protect themselves against 
the increasing threats to their investments and personnel by a hostile environment 
(Maresca 2004: 123f; Sherman 2001; Rittberger 2004).  
On the other hand, the international community felt increasingly overburdened to ad-
dresses all these crises, confronted with the spread of violent intra-state conflict and 
significantly decreased military troops on behalf of western states. Driven by the under-
lying political view, that the private sector could alleviate many public policy problems 
more effectively than the public sector (Hauffler 2004: 159; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009), the 
international community thus turned their eye to private business to contribute to the 
solution of these crises (Ruggie 2004: 30). This development profited from the ongoing 
initiatives to include business companies to contribute to such public policy issue as 
labor or environmental standards under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility 
(Maresca 2004: 121; Feil et al. 2008: 5). Already in 1999 in a speech at the World 
Economy Forum in Davos former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on global 
business to become aware of their responsibilities as corporate citizens and to avoid 
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negative impacts of their operations and to partner with the United Nations in contribut-
ing to good global governance, i.e. in enforcing universal rights and standards (Huckel 
et al. 2007). Since then, company and industry codes of conduct, shared standards and 
initiatives have flourished throughout the business sector (Ruggie 2007; Hauffler 2004: 
160) and with it came an extension of the political expectations towards companies to 
take up responsibilities, even in security issues.  
Already the first policy dialogue within the UN-Global Compact in 2001 dealt ex-
plicitly with “The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict”. It called upon com-
panies to assess the risks and negative impact associated with their operations in zones 
of conflicts, to promote the principles of the Global Compact in these zones and to pro-
actively counter corruption and bribery, thought as drivers in many conflicts (Wolf et al. 
2007: 296f; Fort/Schipani 2004: 17f. In 2004, the UN Security Council took up the is-
sue and established a working group on the “Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, 
Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Peace Building”5. These political announcements and 
expectations have been fueled and strengthened by civil society movements. Companies 
have become the target of a whole range of campaigns and protests during the last dec-
ade. The most well-known among them are the “blood diamond” campaign, focusing on 
the business sector’s fueling of the conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo by purchasing and trading diamonds from conflict parties 
(Bone 2004; Smillie et al. 2000). Another famous campaign was the “Publish what you 
pay” campaign, targeting extractive companies to disclose their payments to host gov-
ernments to counter the lack of transparency of money flows and the resulting economic 
inequality so often reported for resource rich but weak zones of governance 
(Fort/Schipani 2004 17; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009).  
This combined pressure has resulted in a number of initiatives and activities of com-
panies even in the field of security. Among them are the Wolfsberg principles, a volun-
tary commitment of eleven of the world’s largest banks to counter money-laundering 
and terrorist financing strategies,6 the “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights”, developed by the US and the British governments partnering with the biggest 
oil companies, such as BP, Shell, Talisman and Rio Tinto.7 Furthermore, the “blood 
diamond” as well as the “Publish what you pay” campaigns have equally led to govern-
ance initiatives, respectively Kimberley process certification scheme for diamonds of 
2002 (Huckel et al. 2007: 129-132), and Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), a multi-stakeholder initiative, with the aim to increase the transparency of pay-
                                                 
5  See UN Doc. SC/8058 (09.11.2008). 
6  See http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com (09.11.2008). 
7  See www.voluntaryprinciples.org (09.11.2008). 
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ments flows between governments and extractive companies by demanding regular re-
ports of companies (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009). 
What these different initiatives and guidelines share is their voluntary character, be-
ing almost bereft of coercive mechanisms, their overall focus on the extractive industry 
and, finally, their usually indirect security focus, i.e. they are not aimed at involving the 
business sector in war making or war financing but rather in cutting the connection be-
tween war-making and trade or in managing the root causes of political stability and 
unrest, such as economic inequality. Most of these empirically documented involve-
ments of TNCs in the provision of security are to be observed in the context of 
multistakeholder initiatives or public-private partnerships. Although companies are en-
gaging in several forms of governance in zones of conflict, they rarely engage in direct 
security governance, i.e. related to the use of force (Feil et al. 2008: 30).  
Taking this empirical evidence of TNCs in security governance it becomes clear that 
their effect on the state is negligible. TNCs are not involved in the use of force on behalf 
of states. Basically, the involvement of TNCs in security governance is indirect at best 
and rather reflects a compensation strategy for states’ reluctance to intervene directly in 
the manifold conflicts in weak zones of governance. States partner with TNCs or call 
upon them to take over shares of (rather indirect) security policies to unburden them-
selves from the manifold expectations to engage in security policies. It is thus the proto-
type of a modern governance strategy by states to decrease costs and responsibilities as 
well. This is also highlighted by the well-documented fact that many voluntary initia-
tives are reactions to implicit or explicit threats by states to impose state regulations on 
companies or industries if they do not engage voluntarily. They operate under an albeit 
remote shadow of hierarchy (Börzel/Risse 2005: 203f). Apart from the undisputed fact 
that business companies do have superior resources to tackle certain security problems 
effectively (the Kimberley process being a case in point), overall, states are not depend-
ent on the private business sector in contributing to security policies but they utilize it to 
relief their own burden. Given that TNCs are not involved in the direct use of force, 
they similarly hardly affect the legitimation basis of the state’s monopoly of violence. 
Things look a little different once we turn to PSMCs. 
4.2. Private Security and Military Companies: Privatizing Peace 
The rise of Private Security and Military Companies can be roughly associated with the 
end of the Cold War although some of these companies have been active for much 
longer.8 The extent of services and geographical range however, is a newer feature. The 
demand for PSMCs was increasing, the more states in zones of conflicts became unable 
                                                 
8  Especially, the US-military relied on companies already in Vietnam (Singer 2008). 
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to provide for basic levels of security and the more the international community, and 
most often western states especially, felt the pressure to intervene within these conflicts. 
Weak states asked for support to defend themselves against insurgents, rebel move-
ments or simply criminal organizations and were often frustrated by the ignorance or 
slowness of the international community thus turning their eye to PSMCs to satisfy the 
need (Chojnacki/Deitelhoff 2005). Strong states from the OECD-world came under 
enormous pressure to react to an ever-increasing set of conflicts, crises and threats, lead-
ing to more and multiple interventions and often complex post-conflict reconstruction. 
This increased importance of military measures in international security led to general 
overstretches of military capabilities even of the most powerful countries like the US. 
Outsourcing and contracting with Private Security and Military Companies was one 
strategy to alleviate overstretches, ensure flexibility and so called surge capabilities and, 
not less important, decrease costs. In line with that, the nature of warfare changed, giv-
ing rise to high-technology weapon systems that in turn made private support for main-
tenance and even operation necessary (Zamparelli 1999: 11; Schörnig 2007; Deitelhoff 
2008). 
International Organizations or humanitarian organizations were asking for private se-
curity to remain able to deliver humanitarian disaster relief services in such conflict 
zones as public militaries were often not capable or not even present to protect them 
(Spearin 2001; von Boemcken 2007). TNCs faced with massive security problems in 
their day-to-day operations in zones of conflict, finally, turned to PSMCs to secure their 
investments (Avant 2005). The nascent private security industry could rely on a huge 
supply of military personnel and infrastructure on the global market resulting from the 
reductions in troop sizes and the general disarmament of most major armies after the 
Cold War (Singer 2008; Zamparelli 1999).  
These companies should be distinguished from the well-known phenomenon of mer-
cenaries that were particularly active in conflicts on the African continent since World 
War II as PSMCs have become a „regular“industry (Musah/Fayemi 2000). Most of 
them have a professional management; they are legally registered and sometimes even 
traded on the stock markets. Some of the bigger companies are meanwhile part of global 
Consortia such as Halliburton, L-3 Communication or Lockheed Martin (Singer 2008; 
O’Brien 2000). They are business corporations who offer specialized security services 
on a global or regional market. 
Still, the industry is often perceived as a production site for private soldiers fighting 
for conflict parties as some of the early companies actually did, for example, Executive 
Outcomes or Sandline International in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Binder 
2004). However, direct involvement in combat is only a small part of the kind of secu-
rity services these companies offer (Deitelhoff 2008). Their main business areas belong 
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to direct or indirect combat support. They offer logistics (housing, transportation, 
amenities), intelligence (interrogation, satellite surveillance and analysis), training and 
advice (risk-management, training of Special Forces, police, army), personal, convoy 
and facility security and, finally, the whole range of weapons system development, pro-
curement, maintenance and operation (Spearin 2001; Avant 2007b: 424).  
Even though the private security industry is fast evolving and growing at astonishing 
rates since the early 1990s there is still a lack of reliable numbers and figures. Given the 
fluidity of the market, of firms dissolving and recreating themselves, we miss data as to 
the actual number of companies, the sum of their employees or the annual turnover of 
the industry. Given different sources we can probably estimate that about 200-300 dif-
ferent PSMCs are currently active in more than 90 countries (Bures 2005: 535; Singer 
2008). The annual market revenue of the private security industry is purported to in-
crease at a level of eight per cent per year und is supposed to currently lie between 100 
and 200 Billion US-Dollar (Mandel 2002: 11; Von Boehmcken 2007: 261f; Singer 
2008: 78). Especially, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been a boost for the indus-
try. The General Accounting Office of the United States for example estimates that 
about 180 PSMCs are currently working in Iraq (GAO 2006b: 2), offering their serves 
to the coalition troops, the Iraqi government, international organizations, humanitarian 
organizations and local and transnational businesses as well. Figures available for Af-
ghanistan project approximately 90 PSMCs operating there (Joras/Schuster 2008: 11).  
Outsourcing and Contracting is a global phenomenon albeit not an evenly dispersed 
one. It is most advanced in the United States which started an outsourcing initiative al-
ready in the mid 1990s. The United States might be unparalleled in its rate of outsourc-
ing but it is not without followers. The governments of France, the UK, and Israel are 
working with PSMCs (see Kinsey 2006), former CIS-countries’ militaries are trained to 
follow NATO-standards (Krahmann 2007; Avant 2007b: 424). Even the German mili-
tary has increased its privatization aims even though these are still limited to non-core 
functions such as site and facility management (Branovic/Chojnacki 2007). However, 
the Bundeswehr has already relied on PSMCs for troop transportation and facility secu-
rity in Afghanistan (Petersohn 2006: 15). Remarkably, in almost all new security strate-
gies of western states privatization strategies have found their place (see among others 
German Weißbuch 2006: 74).  
With the rise and spread of PSMCs in conflicts and among states so have worries that 
they might undermine the state monopoly of violence, becoming a rival of the state 
(Singer 2008; Avant 2005; Leander 2005). Part of this worries certainly stem from ex-
periences with PSMCs in weak states and especially so on the African continent. Thus, 
it makes good sense to first analyze the weak state experience before turning to strong 
states’ use of PSMCs. 
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Weak states and PSMCs 
Private security services are mushrooming in most African countries and conflicts alike, 
leaving many worried that they constitute a renaissance of the old “dogs of war”, i.e. the 
prevalence of mercenarism in postcolonial Africa after the Second World War 
(Musah/Fayemi 2000; Muthien/Taylor 2002; Zarate 1998). Mercenaries were a promi-
nent feature of many post-colonial conflicts on the African continent and were often 
part of external commercial interests to keep or regain control of certain resources or 
regions in these countries (McIntyre/Weiss 2007: 76f; Leander 2005: 610).  
Even though the modern PSMCs do not have very much in common with the former 
mercenaries, these worries are not unfounded. Many studies on PSMC-operations in 
African conflicts argue that PSMCs rather weaken than strengthen state structures in the 
long run (McIntyre/Weiss 2007; Singer 2008; Avant 2005; Leander 2005; Chojnacki 
2007). They criticize that their involvement often leads to more fragmentation in the 
supply of security (Chojnacki/Deitelhoff 2005; Leander 2005: 615; Spear 2006: 39), 
that they increase the influence of external commercial but also political interests on 
these states (Chojnacki 2007: 253; McIntyre/Weiss 2007: 68). Others have found that 
they tend to weaken the already shaky loyalty of public military forces to the govern-
ment (Leander 2005: 617), thus diverting resources and recognition from public institu-
tions (Avant 2005: 97), and, finally, rather increase the possibility for further conflict by 
being perceived as a threat by local populations (Joras/Schuster 2008).  
Even though, it is difficult to assess such long-term consequences with any certainty 
at this stage, these criticisms do not come out of the blue. Basically, many weak state 
governments do not have many options in securing or re-gaining their monopoly of vio-
lence when faced with secessionist or rebel movements. Often, their military forces are 
themselves weak and badly trained (Clapham 1999). This might result from a lack of 
resources or simply because the ruling government aims to oppress a potential rival 
from seeking shares of revenues from natural resources, as is the case with many so-
called shadow- or quasi-states (Jackson 1990; Reno 1998; Herbst/Mill 2003). Further-
more, since the end of the Cold war, these weak state governments have overwhelm-
ingly lost the support of superpowers stabilizing their rule. The former superpowers are 
not particularly eager to intervene in some distant African conflicts if they do not see 
manifest interests involved (Sorenson/Wood 2005; Kocks 2007). Thus, Private Security 
or Military Companies may be the last resort to state survival at least as long as these 
governments do have the necessary financial resources to pay (also by third party fund-
ing or expected future revenues from the exploitation of natural resources).9 
                                                 
9  Of course, this does not say anything about the legitimacy of the state in question. 
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The most prominent cases in this regard are the operations of Executive Outcome 
and other PSMCs in the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone in the Mid 1990s. Both 
states suffered from an up rise of civil wars or rebel movements after the end of the 
Cold War. In Sierra Leone, a classic example of a resource rich (diamonds) but weak 
and corrupt state, civil war broke out when a new rebel movement, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) began to invade the country from neighboring Liberia in 1991. The 
rebel movement did not meet much resistance as the public army, as in Angola, was in 
miserable conditions, underpaid (if at all), badly trained and small in number (Singer 
2008: 111). The conditions within and practices of the Sierra Leonean Forces even gave 
rise to the term of the ‘sobel’ (soldier by day, rebel at night) to describe such forces 
(Avant 2005: 84). Quickly, the RUF gained ground and in 1995 it had captured all rele-
vant diamond mining sites and was about to take the capital Freetown. Similarly in An-
gola, another resource rich (oil and diamonds) but weak state, in which civil war had 
taken place already since the days of independence in 1975, but checked upon by the 
superpowers. After the end of the cold war, the rebel movement UNITA gained in 
strength and was able to capture the most important oil facilities of Soyo. In both cases, 
the governments pledged for help to their former colonial powers and the UN alike and 
in both cases, these requests were denied thus leaving the governments with little choice 
but to hire PSMCs.10 
Both cases also show some astonishing similarities with regard to the outcome and 
problems of PSMC-interventions. In both cases, PSMCs were able to rapidly pullback 
the rebel movements with a comparatively small amount of employees on the ground 
(in Sierra Leone, it had at its peak 300 employees on the ground; Vines 1999: 132; in 
Angola, the number was about 500; Singer 2008: 109). The companies were able to 
stabilize the situation in the countries to such a degree that rebel movements were will-
ing to enter into peace negotiations, leading to the Lusaka agreement in 1994 in Angola 
and to the Abidjan peace accord in 1996 in Sierra Leone and democratic elections, 
bringing Ahmed Tejan Kabbah into power (Avant 2005: 90; Spear 2006: 31). 
In both cases, however, similar problems arose. After the PSMCs withdrew from the 
scenes, as was part of the respective peace agreement, in both countries fighting quickly 
resurfaced, leading to a further deterioration of the situation (Fuchs 2007: 110; Singer 
2008: 109). In Sierra Leone, only a unilateral intervention by the British Army in 2000 
could finally put an end to the conflict (Avant 2005: 96; Spear 2006: 30f). 
Even though PSMCs were obviously able to bring short-term stability to the coun-
ties, supporting the state monopoly of violence, they failed in bringing about long-term 
                                                 
10  Both governments entered into several contracts with several PSMCs, among them Executive Outcomes Ghurka 
Security Guards and Sandline International. 
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stability. Part of this problem could probably be attributed to the fact that PSMCs fur-
ther weakened the loyalty of the public forces to the respective governments. In Sierra 
Leone for instance, faced with an unreliable and untrained army, PSMCs turned to the 
Civilian Defense Forces, esp. the Kamajors which were a regional tribal militia. They 
trained the Kamajors to support them in the fight against the RUF. While these proved 
very effective in fighting the RUF, it was rather detrimental to all attempts to consoli-
date the state. The Kamajors became a regionally based rival force in the country lead-
ing to new conflicts between the regular armed forces and the government, and, finally, 
to the military coup against president Kabbah (Fuchs 2007: 109; Singer 2008: 113; 
Avant 2005: 88-91). The shifting of resources to private foreigners and local militias 
exacerbated the already existing tensions between the military and the civilian govern-
ment (Musah 2000: 95). Sierra Leone and Angola also experienced the claimed frag-
mentation of security (Fuchs 2007: 40; Leander 2005). Whether or not it is true that the 
PSMCs were (partly) paid in diamond mining concessions, central part of their contract 
with the governments was (besides frontline operations and the training of the Armed 
Forces) to regain and secure control of the important resource facilities in the countries. 
Thus, PSMCs focused on these areas and so with undeniable successes, leaving other 
parts of the country and population, however, in an even worse security situation. This 
has in turn given rise to a further disaffection of the population from the state, as the 
population suspects that the state rather serves economic interests and not those of its 
citizens (MacIntyre/Weiss 2007: 74). Another consequence is that PSMCs and the min-
ing or drilling companies they protect become increasingly enmeshed in the political 
struggles within the countries as they are perceived as a conflict party closely connected 
with the state, a feature that is also well known in outsourcing strategies in military in-
terventions (see below). Quite similar developments have also been reported for the 
involvement of PSMCs in Papua-New-Guinea or Nigeria (Lilly 2000). These illustra-
tions indeed feed fears that PSMCs rather hollow out than stabilize the state monopoly 
of violence and state formation processes in weak states more generally, at least if they 
are not followed by state interventions (Spear 2006: 40f). As Peter Singer put it nicely 
(2008: 56f), the option to hire PSMCs does release governments from the need to invest 
in state consolidation like developing their economy and public institutions to establish 
tax revenues in the first place, thus undermining the very conditions for a sustainable 
state consolidation in these areas (similarly see MacIntyre/Weiss 2007: 78; Leander 
2005: 617f).  
But does this and how does this translate into strong state experiences, in which state 
formation is long complete and consolidated? To assess this, the following section will 
focus on the outsourcing of security services in military interventions by the US, with a 
special focus on the Iraq-conflict. This case is chosen for two reasons. Outsourcing and 
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privatization is most extreme in the US-case and surrounding the Iraq intervention, thus 
suggesting especially strong values on the dependent variable (i.e. a loss of auton-
omy/control/weakening of democratic legitimation with regard to the monopoly of vio-
lence). If privatization constitutes a transformation of the state we should be able to ob-
serve it here first. Secondly, given the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the 
outsourcing activities, data on the Iraq conflict is comparatively good as the media at-
tention was high. I will, however, rely on other illustrative cases as well. 
Strong states and PSMCs: Outsourcing in the US-military 
It is fairly safe to say that PSMCs have become an integral part of military intervention 
and post-conflict reconstruction during the last years by western powers and especially 
by the United States. Depending on different estimates, up to 190.000 private contrac-
tors are currently operating in Iraq (see GAO 2006b: 2; Singer 2008: 245; CBO 2008: 
15). However, Iraq is not unique. About 25.000 PSMC-employees are operating in Af-
ghanistan and they are prevalent in many other conflicts and post-conflict-settings as 
well (Joras/Schuster 2008: 12).11 Contracts for example of US government agencies 
between 2003 and 2007 with contractors only for the Iraq theater sum up to between 10 
to 85 Billion US-Dollars (CBO 2008). The large variance results from the wide or nar-
row definition of private contractors. A narrow definition includes only armed security 
services, a broader one also logistics and administration. No matter how we define con-
tractors, it is clear that there is no historical precedent to this presence of private con-
tractors in theater, amounting to a 1: 1 ratio (CBO 2008: 12). But even if we consider 
the narrow definition of armed security contractors, we end up at a conservative number 
of about 30.000 employees (CBO 2008: 14).12 Putting this in perspective, the ratio be-
tween military personnel and PSMC-employees has changed from 50: 1 in the first Gulf 
war (1991) to 10: 1 in the Iraq war of 2003 (Isenberg 2007: 83). 
As mentioned before, so far the privatization rate is unparalleled in the US-military. 
Already in the mid-90s, outsourcing and privatization became dominant strategies. The 
Pentagon report on “Improving the Combat edge though outsourcing” thus held that 
Experience in the Department of Defence (DoD) on the private sector consistently and 
unambiguously demonstrates how the competitive force of outsourcing can generate 
savings and improve performance” (DoD 1996) and similarly former Secretary of De-
fence Donald Rumsfeld ordered in 2001 that all areas that were not necessary to be pro-
                                                 
11  In Angola, studies report that since 2002 PSMC numbers have increased to about 100 companies present and 
working. See Joras/Schuster (2008: 47). 
12  The number is certainly too low as the respective agencies (US Aid, DoD, State department) do not have accurate 
numbers on their contractors (Isenberg 2007; GAO 2006a). 
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vided by DOD should be outsourced and privatized to increase efficiency and effective-
ness (Rumsfeld 2001). 
Even though outsourcing is not novel to the US-military, the breadth and degree of 
outsourcing is. While privatization was long confined to non-critical support functions 
apart from theater, nowadays PSMCs are all over the place, working alongside regular 
soldiers in theater as well. Already a third of all US-weapons systems are depending on 
private contractors and this number is steadily increasing (Isenberg 2007; Blizzard 
2004; Singer 2008: 247). But besides weapons maintenance, training and operation in 
theater, PSMCs are also on the rise in other sectors. They provide nearly the complete 
logistics of US-troops deployed abroad, ranging from housing to postal services and 
transportation. Similarly, they guard military facilities, convoys and diplomats and have 
even taken over large portions of military police functions (vgl. GAO 2003; Blizzard 
2004; Petersohn 2006). Finally, they support intelligence, interrogations and are the 
main actors to train foreign military and police forces on behalf of the US (see Krah-
mann 2007).  
In how much do these impressive numbers and functions of outsourcing lead to a 
transformation of the state in the field of security? As outlined in section two, there are 
two broad dimensions to assess this. The first concerns the generality of the trend, i.e. is 
privatization a trend that can be observed along similar lines in the majority of OECD-
states? 
Given the lack of reliable numbers and transparency surrounding privatization and 
outsourcing in the military, it is quite difficult to evaluate this aspect. However, it is 
clear that the United States are a unique case, given its rate of outsourcing, even though 
outsourcing is on the rise in other OECD-states as well. However, for the time being, to 
talk of an epidemic trend would be rather premature. 
More important in the question of transformational effect might rather be the second 
broad dimension. In how much does privatization constitute a fundamental change to 
the state’s role in security beyond simple variation in its institutional makeup, and, sec-
ondly, in how much does privatization affect more than one dimension of the state, 
leading to a different configuration of statehood? To evaluate this dimension in the field 
of privatization of security, the analysis will focus on three broad indicators, (1) does 
privatization affect the state’s autonomy of decision-making on the use of force, (2) 
does it affect the state’ control over the exercise of force and (3) does it affect the le-
gitimating processes on the use of force? Basically, these indicators broil down to the 
question as to whether privatization and outsourcing rather reflect innovative tools for 
states to pursue their security policies or whether they signal a growing dependence of 
states on private contractors. 
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Outsourcing and the autonomy of decision-making 
There are hardly any indicators of a loss of autonomy of decision-making caused by 
outsourcing. First, of all, outsourcing and privatization are clearly intentional strategies 
by strong states and they are not limited to military interventions or crises but are car-
ried out in peace times as well. Basically, the US-government perceives of outsourcing 
to PSMCs as a valuable force-multiplying strategy and an effective tool of foreign pol-
icy. Outsourcing is heralded to increase the flexibility and to increase the cost-
effectiveness of security and military policies. The fist idea is easily explained. All ma-
jor states have decreased their troop sizes significantly after the end of the Cold War 
(Zamparelli 1999; Petersohn 2006). With a general increase in military interventions in 
the 1990s and the global war on terror since 2001 they experienced severe problems to 
live up to their military commitments. Thus, outsourcing security services to PSMCs 
increased their flexibility, alleviating troop overstretch and allowing for rapid response 
capabilities as PSMCs can rapidly deploy forces and quickly relocate them when neces-
sary. Outsourcing thus ensured the possibility of military projection capabilities (see 
also DoD 1996).  
The second argument reflects the general belief that privatization decreases the costs 
of services. Private actors do not have large bureaucracies; they face competition on a 
market and can better specialize on specific services. Furthermore, PSMCs have only to 
be paid for the time of their contract. In contrast to regular forces, states can save on 
training, education, maintenance and pensions. Thus, states rather use PSMCs to retain 
their autonomy of decision-making. This is supported by many incidents in which states 
obviously used PSMCs to regain their autonomy vis a vis international regulations or 
national legislative opposition. Examples would include the training and (alleged) com-
bat support of MPRI, commissioned by the US-government, to the Croat Forces in the 
1990s to tip the balance of power against the Serbs (Operation Storm; see Zarate 1998: 
109; Avant 2007b: 426f), the Arms to Africa affair of the British government after it 
became public that the government was aware of arms exports by the British PSMC 
Sandline to Sierra Leone, grossly violating British arms export laws and a UN embargo 
(Avant 2007b: 438-440; Binder 2007: 317f), or DynCorp’s share of armed counter-
terrorism in Colombia against international and national agreements on the Plan Co-
lombia (Singer 2008: 206f; Wulf 2006: 94). 
Privatization and control over the exercise of force 
At first glance, there are also few indications that would suggest that outsourcing and 
privatization have led to an erosion of the control on the exercise of force – at least not 
with regard to strong states. 
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In contrast to weak states, states within the OECD-world have generally put a limit 
on outsourcing. This limit is the outsourcing of direct combat functions, i.e. the direct 
use of violence. While for instance Angola or Sierra Leone hired PSMCs to fight for 
them, in strong states, outsourcing is limited to combat support and non-lethal areas. 
Surely, the line between combat and combat support is increasingly hard to be drawn in 
many of today’s conflicts or intervention situations, in which there is hardly any clear 
demarcation between a frontline and a hinterland. PSMCs operating or maintaining 
weapons systems but even those who secure convoys are at risk to become involved in 
combat as well, as the incidents in Iraq show (Petersohn 2006; Schaller 2005). How-
ever, the decisive point is that states are determined to preserve the core of the state mo-
nopoly on violence, i.e. the direct engagement in the use of force. Additionally, states 
do seem to have at least a minimal control on the behaviour of PSMCs. They have regu-
lations in place on what and when they are allowed to wear weapons (Isenberg 2007: 
89), contract contents usually specific the range of activities. Still, all these regulations 
do not mean that PSMCs never violate them or are not involved in the exercise of force 
without permission (Singer 2004, 2008). Overall, however, there is no indication of 
PSMCs running loose. However, another aspect of the control of force question is, in 
how much states do have control over the contracts with PSMCs or in how much they 
have become dependent on them. And here are some disturbing developments to be 
observed. 
As mentioned above, states claim to outsource basically to ensure cost-savings and to 
increase effectiveness. New data suggests, however, that cost-savings are hardly real-
ized by outsourcing (GAO 2006a: 4; GAO 2008; Schreier/Caparini 2005: 98). This 
would cast serious doubts on the argument that outsourcing just contributes to an effec-
tive exercise of the state monopoly of violence but would rather suggest a growing de-
pendence of the state on PSMCs.  
Basically, there is hardly any data that support the argument that privatization and 
outsourcing of security generate cost-savings (Isenberg 2006: 155). Even though figures 
are abundant which calculate cost-savings, most of these figures rather represent estima-
tions of cost-savings not realized cost-savings (see Wulf 2005: 190f; Dickinson 2007; 
Avant 2005: 117f; Singer 2008: 157). Instead, newer figures report that outsourcing 
increases the cost of military functions (see GAO 2006 a, b, GAO 2008: 8-15). There 
are two major reasons for this. One is the contract market environment of outsourcing in 
security the other is the political environment of military interventions and crises. The 
possibility of cost-saving by privatization depends on several conditions. First, a trans-
parent and competitive market is needed, so that clients can pick and choose among 
different suppliers. Secondly, contracts must be subject to transparent bidding proce-
dures, competing offers must be systematically compared and the performance of sup-
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pliers on the contract terms has to be closely monitored, and, if necessary, sanctioned 
(Markusen 2003; Singer 2004). None of these characteristics seem to apply to the cur-
rent situations of contracting, however (Dickinson 2007). Only 40 per cent of all con-
tracts of US-government agencies (between 1998 and 2003) were subject to bidding and 
since then the numbers have only slightly increased (Singer 2008).13 Above that, more 
than 50 per cent of all contracts have not been monitored at all (Dickinson 2007: 226). 
Other governments do not fare much better. A new study on Canada’s military contract-
ing concludes that only 60 per cent of all contracts were competitive and that this num-
ber was decreasing (Staples 2007). These numbers explain why so many companies that 
have a record of bad practice and financial fraud or are accused of serious human rights 
violations were again rewarded contracts, among them Halliburton, CACI, Titan or lat-
est Blackwater (see also Dickinson 2007: 219f). 
One reason for this is that the market for private security services is only partially 
competitive, while some quasi-monopolies exist (for instance in certain areas of logis-
tics; see Chesterman/Lehnhardt 2007: 254; Deitelhoff 2008; Cockayne 2007). Addition-
ally, the market is also very fluid. Companies quickly dissolve and re-establish under 
different names and locations, making it difficult to trace wrong-doers. Most PSMCs, 
apart from some of the bigger ones are small, nearly virtual companies which rely on 
huge rosters of potential employees that they hire whenever a new contract comes in. 
Thus, they are very flexible and can locate and re-locate whenever necessary (Dickinson 
2007). In line with that, the widespread practice of sub-contracting in the market re-
duces transparency even further (Wulf 2005: 70). 
Secondly, the political environment of situations of military interventions and crises 
are probably among the least likely environments to favour cost-savings. Situations of 
military interventions are usually characterized by secrecy, heavy time constraints and 
the imperative of military victory. Thus, there is hardly time for neither complex bid-
ding procedures nor the transparency available to assess contract performances. Fur-
thermore, military commanders usually calculate for worst case scenarios thus always 
having a back-up at hand, a strategy that is hardly cost-saving in contracting (Singer 
2008: 163). This explains not only the high number of non-competitive contracts but 
also the widespread practice of so called cost-plus contracts, i.e. contracts, in which the 
rewards increase with the increase of costs (Singer 2004).  
Another cost increasing factor is the coordination problem arising from the increase 
of private contractors in military theater. First, employees of PSMCs on a contract with 
a conflict party usually remain outside the command chain and are not allowed to take 
part in hostilities in conflict as they are regarded as civilians under International Hu-
                                                 
13  See Center for Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid 385). 
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manitarian Law. However, in most of the military interventions today the differentiation 
between frontline and hinterland increasingly blurs, bringing PSMCs who are most ac-
tive in logistics, site and convoy security and weapon maintenance ever closer to theatre 
and to an active participation in hostilities (Schaller 2005, 2007). This not only in-
creases their risks to become a target of military attacks, it also calls upon the regular 
forces to extend their protection to these companies thus leading to higher coordination 
costs. Additionally, coordination is needed to prevent conflicts between the regular 
forces and the PSMCs. The increase of so-called blue-on-white fire in Iraq. i.e. acciden-
tal attacks between US forces and the contractors indicates how difficult that is (GAO 
2005: 28; GAO 2006a). In fact, until now the US-government has no exact number how 
many employees are working for it in Iraq let alone where and when (GAO 2006a: 4). 
Taking all this together one needs to wonder why privatizations is still increasing al-
though the envisioned cost-effectiveness associated with outsourcing security to PSMCs 
is often not realized? Is this a beginning dependence of strong states on PSMCs? It 
would be if strong states would have no effective counter-strategies to end this. How-
ever, it is rather the case that states seem to be unwilling to stop this trend (Deitel-
hoff/Wolf 2009). States have not taken up measures to increase their control over con-
tracts and companies. A telling example for this is that although the number of contracts 
has greatly increased since 2001, the US-government has simultaneously reduced the 
number of controllers and ombudsmen to supervise contracts (Singer 2008: 252). Sec-
ondly, the majority of western states eschew the possibilities to increase the interna-
tional regulation of PSMCs, which would allow them to better track wrong-doers and to 
further competition and a transparent market. States have not only shied away from at-
tempts to set up a UN convention on the banning of these companies, they have also not 
agreed on a binding licensing system. The only existing regulatory framework for com-
panies is the Montreux-document from September 2008, which is a non-binding decla-
ration, signed by 17 states, among them the USA, UK, France and Germany. The docu-
ment has two parts, the first “merely” recalling the legal obligations arising for PSMCs 
under international law and the second part displaying a list of best practices states 
should adhere to in working with PSMCs.14 
Obviously, cost-saving is not the primary focus of strong states in hiring PSMCs but 
it is rather their utility as a flexible policy tool in pursuing security policy. This would 
also explain the weak national regulations systems PSMCs are subject to. In the US, for 
example, the national licensing system only regulates and thus controls the export of 
security services. It regulates the conditions under which PSMCs are allowed to work 
                                                 
14  See Monteux-Document at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-170908 
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for what foreign client not for their home government.15 These regulations rather ensure 
that PSMCs support the foreign policy goals of their governments not that they safe 
costs (vgl. Schneiker 2007: 408).  
Outsourcing and the legitimating process 
Overall, the discussion so far suggests that privatization and outsourcing do not (yet) 
constitute a transformation of the state but should rather be seen as a variation of the 
state’s exercise of its functions. However, a look at the effects on the legitimating di-
mension by outsourcing disposes a different picture. To reveal this, a closer look is 
needed as to whom remains in control over the exercise of violence within the state. The 
flexibility that outsourcing promises for states is essentially a promise directed to the 
executive and it is one that is directed against the legislative and the public more gener-
ally (Deitelhoff/Geis 2007 a, b; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009). 
State governments’ reluctance to increase the regulation of PSMCs discussed above 
is not only out of convenience but it is by design as governments want to increase their 
flexibility vis-a-vis their parliaments and publics alike. PSMCs allow for covert foreign 
policy not consensual among the national public and/or international community and 
they generally increase the power of governments vis a vis their parliaments (Avant 
2007a: 184-187, 2005: 60; Chesterman/Lehnhardt 2007: 252f). Outsourcing to PSMCs 
help governments to hide the extent of their military engagement abroad to their respec-
tive publics and legislatures (Silverstein 2000; Cockayne 2007: 212). Outsourcing might 
thus not weaken the effective exercise of violence and even strengthen the autonomy of 
decision-making but only by undermining its legitimation basis.  
Governments can and do circumvent troop ceilings ordered by parliaments thus free-
ing soldiers for war making, a strategy which the US-government has used in the Bal-
kans conflict and again in its plan Colombia (Avant 2005: 128; Singer 2008: 211-215). 
Secondly, governments can manipulate the public opinion on their foreign policy. Re-
search on democratic peace has convincingly shown that popular consent to military 
operations is a function of the prospect of military victory and the safety of one’s own 
soldiers (Schörnig 2007). Democratic publics are casualty avoiding, but PSMC casual-
ties are not listed in official casualty statistics. Public debates about the estimated 1001 
PSMC casualties in Iraq have at least been absent.16 Most importantly, contracts are 
usually negotiated with by the executive.17 Parliaments have only limited insight in con-
                                                 
15  Other governments do not even have such systems in place, e.g. Great Britain or Germany. 
16  See list at: icasualties.org/oif/Civ.asp; 09.11.2008. The list only reports 426 names but refers to 1001 as a gov-
ernment-based number. 
17  US Congress only needs to be involved in contract negotiations if the contract volume exceeds a limit of 50 Mil-
lion US-Dollar (Schneiker 2007, S. 414). 
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tractual contents or/and are often unaware of these contracts as they are hidden in sev-
eral titles in defence budgets (Singer 2004: 10, 17; Schreier/Caparini 2005: 102). Fur-
thermore, the general practice of sub-contracting makes parliamentary oversight even 
more difficult. This illustrates the fact that the US-Congress still has no accurate data on 
the number of contractors working on behalf of the US in Iraq (GAO 2006a: 4).  
Strengthening regulations on PSMCs would therefore increase political costs: In-
creasing monitoring and transparency and clarifying responsibilities and liabilities 
would make the activities of PSMCs more visible for the public and legislatures alike, 
thus lowering significantly the discretionary powers of executives.18 Hence, govern-
ments do not have much of an interest in regulating PSMCs as their advantages are tied 
to the fact that their activities are less visible and weakly regulated (see also Caparini 
2007: 166; Cockayne 2007: 206; Dickinson 2007: 228). It is no mistake that it is rather 
the PSMCs themselves than governments who argue for national binding regulation, if 
only to secure their market position (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009; Schneiker 2007: 407f; Dick-
inson 2007: 230). Regulatory initiatives only follow public pressure. The latest incidents 
in Iraq especially with the Blackwater shootings of civilians in fall 2007 have greatly 
increased public awareness of PSMCs and pressure to step up to regulate their conduct 
and to punish offences.19 Only after public outrage and under enormous pressure by 
congress, the US-government has started to close legal gaps,20 such as extending juris-
diction to civilian contractors working for DOD agencies and lately also for those work-
ing for the state department and other US agencies.21 Basically, what becomes clear is 
that outsourcing does affect the state organization of violence, however not directly and 
not in the short run. While it does not directly affect state control of the exercise of vio-
                                                 
18  See also Avant/Sigelman (2008), who analyzed the (amount and type of) media coverage of PSMCs in Iraq com-
pared to coverage of US-Military. 
19  However, incidents did not start with Iraq. DynCorp employees were involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia in the 
1990s. In Angola, PSMC employees are accused of torturing and even killing mine workers and in Colombia 
PSMCs are accused of a whole range of abuses and crimes (Singer 2008: 251; Grofe 2007: 243). Iraq only differs 
from previous PSMC-operations by the higher frequency and visibility of incidents.  
20  Similar dynamics can be observed in Great Britain, where coordination between PSMCs and the government is 
largely informal. Tighter regulation has only been discussed after scandalizations and public outcry. The famous 
“green paper” on regulation of PSMCs of the British government was solely a reaction to the “Arms to Africa” 
affair, in which the British PSMC Sandline International had delivered arms to Sierra Leone, grossly violating ex-
isting arms embargos, but nevertheless implicitly supported by the government (see Avant 2007b: 438f; 
Lehnhardt 2007: 140f). 
21  See Jane’s Defence Weekly (10.01.2007: 5). 
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lence and might even increase state autonomy of decision-making it is effectively un-
dermining the legitimating basis of the state monopoly of violence.  
Strong states outsource services basically to generate more flexibility thus highlight-
ing that they perceive of PSMCs not as a threat to their monopoly but as an innovative 
strategy to exercise their monopoly. 
However, this does not mean that outsourcing may not lead to a weakening of the 
control of the exercise of violence in the long run. The higher the rate of privatization 
and outsourcing, the higher the risk for the state to lose generic resources to exercise its 
monopoly. This is already visible within the United States. In certain areas such as lo-
gistics, the US-forces have lost generic capabilities, meaning that they are reliant on 
private contractors to perform these functions (Avant 2005: 133; Zamparelli 1999). The 
renewing of the logistics-contract with Halliburton although the company was repeat-
edly accused of overbilling and fraud, highlights this risk. The US-military simply had 
no own resources to take over logistics on their own (Schreier/Caparini 2005; Deitelhoff 
2008).22 But the problem is not limited to resources, but also to manpower and expertise. 
Experts warn that in vital areas such as military training (Avant 2005: 116-120; Wulf 
2005: 70; Isenberg 2006: 156), weapons maintenance and operation (Petersohn 2006: 
21; Zamparelli 1999) as well as military policing (Avant 2005: 127, the US has lost ge-
neric competences (Blizzard 2004). The more certain areas are privatized the more the 
military experiences a brain drain as well (Avant 2005: 134f). PSMCs rely on their ex-
cellent well-trained employees to be attractive companies for states. They recruit these, 
however, in the special forces of state militaries, such as green berets or delta forces. 
The US-military has already started to work with stop-loss programs to counter this 
strain of expertise in the force structure to prevent that their best officers can directly be 
hired by the private sector. Furthermore, it has started to grant high-ranking officers 
huge monetary rewards to convince them to stay in the forces. Again, this is not a prob-
lem of the US alone. Australia grants its officers a one year sabbatical to give them the 
chance to profit from the much higher salaries in the private sector but to return then 
(Singer 2008: 257). Thus, the gain in flexibility might come with a much higher price 
for states in the long run than expected. 
                                                 
22  Given the threat of a dependence of the forces on private contractors DoD has ordered that the forces need to 
have back-up plans if contractors drop out. However, the General Accounting Office has repeatedly warned that 
these back-up plans were either non-existent (GAO 2003: 16) or insufficient (GAO 2006 a, b). A problem that 
popped up again after the Blackwater shooting and subsequent prohibition of the firm’s operation by the Iraqi 
government. Blackwater is responsible for the protection of the State Department diplomats. Thus, the US-
government pressured Al-Maliki to lift the prohibition on Blackwater as the State Department had no back-up and 
was dependent on Blackwater’s services. 
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All these trends should be monitored closely without underestimating the persistent 
force of the state in upholding its control. It remains, however, clear, that outsourcing is 
an intentional strategies of executives to unravel the democratic control system in place.  
5. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED: BUSINESS OF SECURITY AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE? 
First of all, the analysis and comparison of the inclusion of TNCs and PSMCs in secu-
rity policies clearly shows that states involve these actors intentionally, as part of a 
modern governance strategy to exercise their functions. This is most straightforward in 
the inclusion of transnational corporations to engage in security policies. They are basi-
cally thought of as compensation to states’ reluctance to intervene more directly into the 
manifold conflicts in weak states. It is releasing strong states of their burden to provide 
security by themselves and a possibility to shift the blame to the private sector. Out-
sourcing and contracting with PSMCs follows similar lines. It is not, as always claimed 
in the political debate, the potential to decrease the financial costs of security policies 
that fuels outsourcing strategies but the decrease of political costs. State executives can 
increase their flexibility in security policies by relying on PSMCs, either by licensing 
their export to third states or by hiding the extent and (the lack of) success of their own 
military engagement abroad.23 In this vein, privatization through TNCs or PSMCs rather 
strengthens the state autonomy on decisions on the use of force. They help state gov-
ernments to increase their discretionary power in security policies vis-a-vis their na-
tional legislative and electorate or the international community. 
Things do not look much different with regard to the control over the exercise of 
force. For TNCs, it is safe to say that they do not affect the state in this regard as they 
are not involved in any direct or indirect way in the use of force but rather address indi-
rect security problems pertaining to the connection of political instability and violence 
to economic and social problems. Accordingly, their contribution to security rather af-
fects weak states not the consolidated (TRUDI) states of the OECD-world. PSMCs are 
involved in security policies of weak and strong states. However, until now strong states 
jealously secure the core of their monopoly of violence, i.e. the direct use of force. 
However, there are some disturbing tendencies as well. The faster privatization pro-
ceeds, the more states might become dependent on PSMCs as they lose generic re-
sources and competencies in certain areas of security, such as logistics, training, weap-
                                                 
23  Privatization and outsourcing thus might be conceptualized as complementary strategies of a new raison d’état, as 
Wolf (2000) termed it, While he observed how executives bind themselves to international cooperation to gener-
ate autonomy vis-a-vis their legislatives and publics, in this case executives delegate functions to private business 
actors to achieve the same effect (also Deitelhoff/Wolf 2009).  
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ons operation and maintenance and military policing. In how far this danger becomes a 
reality is however to be assessed in the future. The so called “Iraq bubble” has led to a 
rush in outsourcing within the US-military and it remains to be seen whether the gov-
ernment will revise (and how so) its privatization strategies and if and how other gov-
ernments in the OECD-world will learn from the US experience.  
Privatization and outsourcing are unparalleled in the USA, but other governments are 
increasing privatization within their militaries as well. Still, it is premature to talk of an 
epidemic development. Privatization thus stops short of transforming the state, it is nei-
ther epidemic nor has it led to an essential erosion of the state’ monopoly of violence 
yet. However, it does affect another aspect of the state’s monopoly of violence, i.e. its 
legitimating base, binding the use of force to democratic control and due legal process. 
The net gain of involving PSMCs in security policies seems to be the emancipation of 
state governments from their legislative and electorates more broadly. Empirical evi-
dence suggests an undermining of democratic control mechanisms which in turn affects 
the reinforcing nature of TRUDI’s dimensions. 
This aspect of unravelling the monopoly of force from its legitimating basis is not 
only worrysome from a democratic point of view. It should also alert us given its global 
repercussions. The increasing reliance on military means in global governance, that is to 
be observed since the 1990s (see Geis 2006; Duffield 2001) might not be a direct or 
singular effect of this unravelling but the latter might very well contribute to and further 
fuel it. Normative and institutional thresholds on the use of force are mechanisms to 
slow down political decisions on the use of force to give executives a chance to reflect 
on their decisions and motifs and to search for alternative options. Privatization essen-
tially lowers these thresholds thus making the resort to force an easier and more attrac-
tive option for executives (Deitelhoff/Geis 2007a, b).  
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